Marina Fe B. Durano
International Gender and Trade Network-Asia

Introduction

The impetus for “progressive liberalization1” in the trade in services has prompted a serious look at the impact of this policy on various services sectors. Among the sectors that women and feminists have chosen to study is the audio-visual2 services sector.

This paper begins to unravel the implications of various trade agreements under the World Trade Organization (WTO) on women and, more importantly, on cultural transformation that promotes gender equality.

The essay begins with an identification of the elements of the different trade agreements that have an impact on the structure and character of the audio-visual services sector. The identification includes the issues and debates that have occurred around the policies applied to this sector.

• *In the first section, market access is gaining greater prominence in the debates than the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity. Exemptions put in place in the schedules of commitments of some WTO members could be removed while subsidies to the audio-visual sector are under scrutiny for being trade-distorting.
• A second section discusses the knowledge content of the audio-visual sector. In particular, the appropriateness of the use of strict intellectual property regimes to protect the monopoly position of content-providers to the audio-visual industry is questioned.
• A third section looks at the bigger picture of the sovereign scope of governance. The theme gains relevance when regulatory policies discussed in the first two sections are seen within the bounds of national borders. International trade agreements are encroaching into these beyond-the-border regulations by setting an implicit standard of acceptability. A regulation is acceptable if it is not trade-distorting and a WTO dispute panel can easily become judge and jury over matters of domestic governance.

In which direction would these discussions take with respect to the trade negotiations? An analysis of US bilateral trade agreements provides an indication of the type of commitments that the US is looking for in the area of audio-visual services and digital media. The bilateral agreements point to a preference by the US for lock-in provisions applied to regulations covering digital products and media, including new technologies.

A contestation over the public and private divide is identified in the media services sector. The private side offers pecuniary gains through income, employment and product variety while the public side is expressed as enhanced access and service provision as well as content regulation and support. International trade agreements carry a bias for unfettered private provision with little acknowledgement of the development contributions that media as culture carriers can provide. A re-examination of the audio-visual and mass media services is required. Trade agreements should stop looking at these services simply as commodities for profit. Continuing to do so effectively limits the development potentials of mass media.

Market Access Versus Protection of Cultural Diversity

The most important trade agreement under the WTO that will have an impact on the audio-visual services sector is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). However, there are also other WTO agreements that are relevant to the audio-visual sector. These include the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article IV. Other trade agreements that could have an impact are the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping), the Agreement on Safeguards, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. Although the latter set of trade agreements apply generally to the trade in goods, there are audio-visual service products whose classification as a good or a service is controversial.

Coverage of the Audio-Visual Sector

This service sector covers both software and hardware segments. The software segment includes program production and distribution while the hardware segment includes the manufacture of equipment. Unfortunately, the dividing line between the two segments has proven to be contentious such that a definition in the WTO has yet to be clarified.

Under the Services Sectoral Classification List of the GATS, the audio-visual sector falls under the larger classification of Communication Services. The audio-visual sector has various sub-sectors that include the motion picture and video tape production and distribution services, the motion picture projection services, the radio and television services, the radio and television transmission services, the sound recording services, and other services that are yet unspecified.

Despite the wide range of applicable agreements, perhaps the main debate defining the liberalization of trade in audio-visual services is the debate over increasing market access of foreign audio-visual service providers and the extent of protection of cultural diversity. Market access is an essential objective of the liberalization of audio-visual services that allows the unhindered entry and sale of foreign service providers and products. Part of the commitment to liberalize is to grant national treatment to foreign service providers after entry into the domestic markets. In other words, laws, rules and regulations applied to the audio-visual services sector should not differentiate between foreign and domestic providers, in particular, these laws should not favour domestic providers over foreign ones. Zampetti (2003) provides examples of the various laws, rules and regulations that could be affected by the two types of liberalization commitments.

“The main types of cultural policies and instruments currently in place in different jurisdictions potentially fall within the meaning of market access or national treatment as defined in GATS. In the area of market access restrictions, there are widespread measures that control access to film markets, including screen quotas for cinemas (as in Mexico, South Korea and Spain); prohibitions of dubbing of foreign films (Mexico); dubbing licenses (e.g. in Spain, film distributors can only receive a dubbing licnense for foreign films when they contract to distribute a certain number of national films) and quantitative restrictions, as was the case in India, which used to restrict the import of film titles to 100 per year; as well as foreign investment and ownership restrictions, including divestiture policies, for example, in the broadcasting industry and news media in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In the area of national treatment many countries use domestic content requirements, especially measures regulating radio and television broadcasting content. For example, European Communities, Australia, Canada, and France use domestic broadcast content to control access to their television broadcast and film markets; as well as discriminatory regulatory/licensing restrictions, especially measures that control access to radio or television broadcasting through regulatory or licensing restrictions (Canada). Furthermore, many national and regional audiovisual policies rely on discriminatory subsidies, involving the provision of grants, loans and tax preferences for the production or co-production of cultural works, most notably audio-visual products. For example, Eurimages, an initiative by the Council of Europe, provides subsidies for the co-production of European audiovisual works. The Media II program of the European Communities, while excluding the support of production, focuses on training for professionals, the development of attractive projects and the transnational distribution of audiovisual programs and films. National programs providing subsidies to the domestic film industry exist in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and Switzerland.” (Zampetti, 2003: 5-6)

On the other hand, the protection of cultural diversity, primarily through public subsidies granted to the audio-visual sector, is meant to promote and preserve local and national cultural products and expressions. The Australia Broadcasting Authority (ABA) (1999) in discussing trade liberalisation in the audiovisual sector pointed out that the “audiovisual services sector is an important and influential medium for cultural expression (ABA, 1999: i),” hence, regulation of this sector focuses on safeguarding and promoting cultural products. The ABA (1999) states that “cultural products are valued for the contribution they make to a sense of community identity and well-being (APBU, 1999: i).” Specific to public broadcasting is the motivation for regulation based on the preservation of a public sphere for political and social debate, according to Verhulst (1999). This motivation has led to calls for ensuring universal access and public provision of audiovisual services.

The Schedules of Commitments after the Uruguay Round of negotiations indicate the need for several countries to create exemptions for certain restrictions and limitations in order to preserve cultural identities or “promote regional identity, cultural values, and linguistic objectives (Zampetti, 2003: 8). According to Zampetti (2003), “no fewer than 27 States, including the EC and its Member States, Canada, many Latin American and Arabic countries, have asked to have cinema and television subsidized co-production and co-distribution agreements inscribed as MFN exemptions…. (Zampetti, 2003: 7)” MFN exemptions refer to those policies that countries can exempt from the most-favoured nation obligation, which requires WTO-member countries to expand the most favourable treatment from one or a few trading partners to all the WTO members. In general, Zampetti (2003) points out that the GATS does not contain a cultural exception that could be applied to the audio-visual services sector unlike the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which allows cultural industries to be exempted from the obligations under the NAFTA subject to some limitations.

One of the most common forms of supporting the audio-visual sector for purposes of cultural preservation is the subsidy. A subsidy is any support that a government or public authority grants to the audio-visual service provider or industry3. As yet, there is no definition of a subsidy for the services sector. Article XV of the GATS specifies the creation of multilateral disciplines on subsidies and countervailing measures that are applicable to the trade in services taking into account flexibilities for developing countries. The Working Party on GATS Rules has not yet arrived at an agreement on this definition and continues discussions in this area4. Despite this absence of a definition, Paragraph 1 obliges the exchange of information on subsidies among the member countries. Obviously, the basis of this exchange is unclear as the definition is still under negotiations any exchange of information might prejudice the negotiations in one way or another. Furthermore, Paragraph 2 allows for the consultations to occur if a subsidy is found to adversely affect a member country on the stipulation that consultation “requests shall be accorded sympathetic consideration (WTO, 1999: 298).”

Intellectual Property Protection versus Knowledge as a Public Good

Among the various forms of intellectual property protection, it is the copyright and neighbouring rights that are most relevant for the audio-visual sector. Copyright refers to the protection accorded to authors to exclusively take advantage of their work, whether for commercial or non-commerical purposes, while neighbouring rights refer to the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings, and rights of broadcasting organizations. The objective of these rights is to provide incentives and rewards to the creators, which is believed to be an important component for the development of the industry. These rights are protected under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). The TRIPs consolidates the Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms (Geneva Convention), and the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention). The TRIPs not only consolidates these conventions but also adds some new and even higher standards of protection.

The relevance of intellectual property protection for economic development has been questioned. The new rules provided by TRIPs appear to be a restriction with respect to the policy options that could be available to developing countries. Chang (2004) discussed how historical evidence indicates that many of the developed countries did not provide protection of intellectual property during their development stage and only implemented a strict intellectual property rights regime at the point when these countries were already capable of producing their own original inventions, trademarks and copyright materials. Furthermore, Chang (2004) said that the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake or for the public good is enough of a strong incentive to generate new knowledge. There are, in addition, natural protective mechanisms that allow an inventor or creator to reap the benefits from a first mover advantage. Chang (2004), for example, refers to the “imitation lag”, a “reputational advantage”, and a head start in the race down “learning curves”. Chang (2004) goes on further by calling for a reform or elimination of the TRIPs agreement.

“My view is that TRIPS should be radically reformed or even abolished. First of all, there should be greater recognition on the part of the developed countries that, when there were themselves developing countries, they were engaged in all kinds of ‘illegitimate’ practices in order to acquire advanced technology, including the violation of PIPR (private intellectual property rights) (especially that of foreign nationals). Second, there should be a greater acceptance that developing countries need fundamentally different IPR regimes from the ones that the developed countries have today. Developing countries should be allowed to grant weaker PIPR (e.g., shorter patent life, easier compulsory licensing and compulsory working, easier parallel imports) and to pay lower licensing royalty rates (probably graduated according to a country’s ability to pay). Third, TRIPS should be reformed (or abolished) in such a way that it does not merely lead to greater and cheaper transfer of technologies but also develops the long-term technological capabilities of developing countries, without which an easier access to technology means little. We could also institute an international tax on patent royalties and use at least parts of it for improving technological capabilities in developing countries.” (Chang, 2004: 273)

These arguments have strong implications on the development and use of new technology in the audio-visual sector. This becomes relevant below when the position of the United States of America on policies regarding digital technology and digital products becomes more apparent.

Trebilcock and Howse (1999) prefers to take a more matter-of-fact view of the debate surrounding TRIPs saying that “once we have established that the issue is actually the level of compensation to which a creator is entitled, then it is clear that at least implicitly the creator’s claims are being balanced against other social interests (Trebilcock and Howse, 1999: 308).” Indeed, Trebilcock and Howse (1999) recognizes that creations and inventions do not happen in a social vacuum.

“Society provides the context in which creative activity takes place—few inventions or works of art or literature spring fully grown from the inventor’s head. They usually depend on education within society, and build on the work of many others. There is thus a limit to the extent that creators can declare the work totally their own, and exclude any claim by society on some of that value.” (Trebilcock and Howse, 1999: 308)

Domestic Regulation as Non-Tariff Barriers versus Sovereign Scope of Governance

As indicated in the section above, cultural exceptions cannot be claimed for the audio-visual services sector. Subsidies to the services sector have also been difficult to establish clearly as trade-distorting. The GATS, particularly Article VI covering domestic regulation, stipulates that regulations “not be more burdensome than necessary”. The measures covered include those applied by national and local governments and authorities as well as non-governmental bodies exercising powers delegated by national and local governments and authorities. The audio-visual services sector is regulated for various reasons, including censorship and other forms of content regulation.

Trebilcock and Howse (1999) describe the situation, thus: “It has become increasingly difficult to delineate the boundaries between a nation’s sovereign right to regulate and its obligation to the international trading community not to restrict trade gratuitously (Trebilcock and Howse, 1999: 135).” In particular, the difficulties attached to the contested boundaries of trade and domestic regulation have been analysed with respect to health and safety standards, especially with respect to jurisprudence produced in the WTO. This analysis will have to be extended to the specific forms of regulation applied to the audio-visual services sector.

According to Trebilcock and Howse (1999), a dispute panel facing the question of contested boundaries can use three “tests”, each with their own challenges. The first is the “sham” test where the dispute panel tries to find out if “the country with the offending standard has intended to adopt a policy in bad faith (Trebilcock and Howse, 1999: 163).” This test implies that panels need to be able to assess the intention of policy, which is clearly difficult to establish since it would require an understanding of the policymaking processes of a country.

A second test is based on scientific risk assessment, which implies some objectivity to the test. However, experience has shown that normative judgements are present especially in the choice of methodology. The panel is thus faced with conflicting scientific evidence, which may be beyond the expertise of the panel that is usually made up of lawyers and diplomats.

The third test is the proportionality test where the panel must decide on whether the choice of regulatory measure is proportional to the stated objective of the regulatory measure. This last test is most relevant to the GATS Article VI provision quoted above.

“As the legal test for evaluating whether a measure is ‘necessary’ is based on whether a least trade-restrictive measure has been employed, a panel will be required to engage in what may be a very complex policy inquiry into the various policy alternatives and their viability in achieving the stated policy goal. In answering these questions, panellists are drawn into an uncomfortable area of second-guessing expert domestic regulators. … The question of proportionality can easily extend into an inquiry about the validity of the stated goal itself, ….” (Trebilcock and Howse, 1999: 164)

The GATS has the added feature that the manner of implementation can be raised as a case for a non-tariff barrier. The administrative implementation of laws, rules and regulations that could fall under the GATS purview can also be subject to negotiation and dispute settlement.

“Article VI requires members to ensure that measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. To bring this about, the agreement reaches beyond the layer of the law to be found in the statute books and deeper into the disparate legal cultures of the member countries (Arup, 2000: 132).”

This final feature of the GATS is quite compelling in that “quality of governance” can now become a subject of trade disputes. International trade agreements, especially those under the WTO, have become judge and jury on broad matters of internal governance.

Market access, national treatment and most-favoured-nation obligations of trade agreements will normally deal with regulations concerning competition that deals not only with market shares and ownership but also with standardisation and interconnection. Other regulatory objectives that could fall under the ambit of GATS Article VI would be content regulation and regulation for media diversity and pluralism. The motivations behind these regulations are not likely to be debated. However, under an environment of “progressive liberalisation” these regulations can be subjected to any of the tests described above.

The Future of Negotiations: US Bilateral Treaties as an Indicator

Bernier (2004) provides an analysis of the United States’ most recent bilateral treaties that can be used as an indicator of the direction that WTO negotiations on audio-visual services might take. The analysis looks at the trade agreements that the US concluded with Chile in 2002, Singapore and the Central American States separately in 2003, and Australia and Morocco separately in 2004. The US was and continues to be the central character in the GATS, both during the Uruguay Round and the current set of negotiations. Among the negotiating stances that the US has taken recently is the position that a benchmark for negotiations be used in Geneva in order to pursue further liberalization under the GATS. Among the possible benchmarks that could be used are the bilateral trade agreements that the US has signed recently. This section relies heavily on Bernier (2004) and a summary of the US approach is provided in the quote below.

“The main characteristics of the new U.S. negotiating strategy, as they emerge from those policy statements, can be described as follows. The first one consists in the adoption of the most liberal approach possible to schedule trade commitments, that is, the negative list approach. The second one consists in the broad acceptance that existing financial support schemes for culture and content production need not be dismantled. The third one, perhaps the most surprising, consists in the relinquishing of traditional demand that local content requirements and other barriers to trade be totally eliminated in the audiovisual sector, at least where traditional technologies are involved. The fourth and last characteristic, at the core of the new strategy, consists in the demand that States commit themselves to keep digital networks free of cultural protectionism.” (Bernier, 2004: 3)

The first part of the strategy refers to the negotiating modality that was used during the Uruguay Round. A positive list approach afforded WTO member countries the flexibility to choose which services sectors they would liberalize leaving unlisted sectors outside of the negotiations. Thus, developing countries tended to offer fewer sectors for liberalization than the developed countries, especially since their trade in services was not significant enough. Unfortunately, this source of flexibility is not protected by the GATS text since the Agreement does not have anything to say about negotiating modality. The bilateral agreements that Bernier (2004) analysed preferred the use of the negative list, which means that all services sectors are included in the negotiations except for those found in the negative list. Currently, the US has taken the stance that no a priori exceptions are to be taken for the GATS negotiations.

The second part of the strategy appears to be a concession on the part of the US. The services chapter of the bilateral treaties provide an exemption to subsidies and grants provided by the government or a state-enterprise, including loans, guarantees and insurance. According to Bernier (2004), the US itself uses subsidies and is aware of the common usage of such policies in many countries. The discussion above has already pointed out the difficulty of defining and identifying the use of subsidies in the services sector.

“However, the concession made by the United States regarding subsidies, when considered in context, is more apparent than real. The truth of the matter is that the production of audiovisual and cinematographic content in most countries of the world is practically impossible without subsidies. The United States know very well that any attempt to seriously constrain the use of subsidies in those sectors would meet a lot of resistance abroad. Furthermore, since the decision of the WTO Appeal Board in U.S. - Tax treatment of foreign sales corporations, 15 we know now that they have themselves offered considerable subsidies to their own audiovisual sector; and judging by the proposals made so far to implement the decision, chances are that the audiovisual sector will continue to benefit from very substantial financial support in the future, albeit in a different way. More importantly, they don’t need to be really concerned by what other States do in that respect. Since they can absorb a substantial part of the cost of producing creative content in their own huge market, this allows them in turn to sell such content in the rest of the world at a price locally adjusted. Yet, according to Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, “U.S trade negotiators have made it clear that they will target very trade-distorting financial support schemes”, which brings from him the following comment : “As most subsidy scheme may have a trade-distorting effect, the implication of this qualification is not totally clear.” (Bernier, 2004: 6-7)

The third segment of the strategy involves the softening of the position on local content requirements but the softer position is taken in order to prevent new measures in this area from being taken up. Thus, a freeze in current regulations becomes the maximum applicable protection for that service sector concerned, in this case the audio-visual services sector.

Finally, the fourth segment is a strategy that is similar to the third. Rather than a ceiling on policy measures, a limitation is placed on the carrier of the content, principally digital media. The bilateral trade agreements that Bernier (2004) covered included a chapter on electronic commerce, which discusses the electronic supply of services and digital products, among others. The provisions for the electronic supply of services ensure that the obligations in the chapters on cross-border supply of services, financial services and investments also apply. The more innovative part, according to Bernier (2004) is the provision covering digital products.

“The provisions regarding “digital products” are more elaborate and constitute the truly innovative part of that Chapter. The definition of “digital products” in the five Chapters refers to “computer programs, text, video, images, sound recordings, and other products that are digitally encoded and transmitted electronically, regardless of whether a Party treats such products as a good or a service under its domestic law”. In a note annexed to that definition in the Chile – U.S. Free Trade Agreement, it is mentioned, “for greater certainty”, that the definition of digital products “is without prejudice to the on-going WTO discussions on whether trade in digital products transmitted electronically is a good or a service”. As we shall see, the provisions on “digital products” to all intents and purposes circumvent that distinction by making them subject in practice to the same obligations. Most cultural products including books and periodicals (but more particularly audiovisual products such as films, television programs, multimedia and music) are or can be made available as digital products, the tendency being towards an increasing digitalization of cultural products (almost completely realized in the case of music and multimedia, in the process of being realized in the case of television and films).” (Bernier, 2004: 16-17)

The most important objective is to secure the free and unhindered circulation of digital products. For example, the bilateral agreements stipulate that digital products transmitted electronically will not be taxed or subjected to customs duties. If there will be taxation, the tax should be based on the cost of the carrier media, e.g. the compact disc, and not on the cost of the digital product contained in the carrier, which could be higher than the carrier media. The national treatment obligations and the most-favoured-nation obligations are also encompassing in scope with respect to technological developments and any new measures. In other words, the provisions are written as broadly as possible so that new digital products or media are covered and any new measures would be subjected to national treatment and most-favoured-nation obligations. The wording in the bilateral agreements states thus, “…other like digital products that are created, produced, published, stored, transmitted, contracted for, commissioned, or first made available on commercial terms in its territory,” which is applied to the obligations. The broad scope ensures that the US need not go through another set of negotiations every time there is a technological advancement that appears to be outside the scope of existing regulations or trade agreements. The US position that forces lock-in commitments for new measures is likely to limit the amount of flexibility available to regulators when responding to technological developments, whether in convergence or any other area.

Social Purpose and Public Goods

The purpose of this essay has been to examine the possible implications of the various trade agreements on the audio-visual services sector and to understand what these implications could mean to women. We find that the trade agreements are defining the bounds and limits of acceptable policies and regulations. Cultural transformation leading to gender equality often involves content regulation and access regulation needed to direct audio-visual services towards social goals and objectives. Hence, the contestation between public and private divide is expressed in the media services sector as well. The private side refers more to the unlimited expansion of markets and private provision while the public side is expressed through regulation and through public services. International trade agreements enter into the contestation by creating a policy and regulatory bias for unfettered private provision.

The justification for expansion of markets is the familiar promise of employment, income generation and an increase in the variety of consumption products. These pecuniary returns, however, are not necessarily the superior rationale or the only rationale. Audio-visual services as carriers of culture add to the quality of life in many other different ways. Regulation helps to encourage the development of these carriers so that they contribute to human development.

Amartya Sen’s comments on the role of music in Africa’s development probably illustrates the non-monetary value of cultural products that can be carried by the audio-visual services sector, while acknowledging that the protection of rights and entitlements to music secures economic returns to the music industry and its practitioners. Sen (2004) also highlights that music is a source of joy and fulfilment in and of itself and should be valued for it. Furthermore, Sen (2004) continues:

“A third contribution that must be noted is the part that music plays in the sustaining of old identities and the creation of new ones. People see themselves as belonging to various different groups, related to their nationality, their community, their work, their profession, their language and literature, their political affiliations, their religions. Music not only helps to strengthen the solidarity that group identities can generate, but can also help to overcome narrowly divisive groupings that tend to split up a culture into battling groups along the lines of artificially sustained "separations." Music is not only a great harmonious influence in general, it can also assist in sustaining broad cultural solidarity and to some extent even help to resist the inter-group rivalries that cause so much bloodshed in Africa (and elsewhere). Music has played a uniting role in the lives of African Americans, both in the north and in the south of America (including the Caribbeans), and the integrative contribution of culture in general and music in particular must not be neglected for Africa itself.

Fourth, music is not just entertainment, but also dialogue. It is not surprising that music has often been at the vanguard of protest movements and in general has tended to give some voice to the voiceless. The destituted and the marginalized can use music as a vehicle of communication and expression, and a well-developed music industry, with firm channels of transmission, can give eloquence to voices that are otherwise muted and muffled.” (Sen, 2004: 1-2)

Certainly, among the “artificially sustained separations” that music and other cultural products could bridge is that between women and men. Thus, policies that promote the development of cultural products and the carriers of cultural products contribute not only to the promotion of peace and democracy but also to gender equality. This view of cultural products and the potential role of audio-visual services sector as carriers of cultural products highlights the importance of seeing this sector as providing public goods. And the provision of public goods is in itself a public service.

The expansion of the audio-visual services markets does not guarantee the universal access of cultural products. However, publicly-provided audio-visual services are under attack from budget cuts or poor public support. There are some non-government organizations that see community broadcasting as a bridge between privately provided services and publicly provided services. Unfortunately, government support for these community-based approaches have not been as strong. Furthermore, these are “private” (but not-for-profit) activities are also under the mercy of the amount of finances5 they can generate, which are seldom stable or adequate.

The view of public service and public goods allows us to draw attention to the social purpose of audiovisual services sector. The contribution of music to democracy that Sen (2004) articulated above is also expressed by Raboy (1999) as the social purpose of broadcasting. In particular, Raboy (1999) raises the concept of citizenship.

“The notion of citizenship has severe implications for broadcasting. Citizenship cannot be passive. Citizenship is political. When public service broadcasting is linked to the idea of citizenship, it must logically be decoupled from the authoritarian power of the state. At the same time, it cannot be commodified. This is not a question of principle but of purpose. The main point of distinction between public service and private sector broadcasting is that the latter is only commercially-driven, while the former, despite the various shapes and forms it assumes from time to time and place to place, is necessarily propelled by a different logic.” (Raboy, 1999: 9)

International trade agreements fail to appreciate this “different logic.” International trade agreements ignore the social purposes of various modes of expression only seeing these modes of expression and their carrier services simply as commodities that exist outside of their social context. Rather than promote an “enabling environment,” international trade agreements only serve to shackle the potential of cultural transformation for the achievement of gender equality through mass media services.

 

References

Arup, Christopher (2000). The New World Trade Organization Agreements: Globalizing Law Through Services and Intellectual Property. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Australian Broadcasting Authority (1999). “Trade Liberalisation in the Audiovisual Services Sector and Safeguarding Cultural Diversity,” A discussion paper commissioned by the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union,

Bernier, Ivan (2004). “The Recent Free Trade Agreements of the United States as Illustration of their New Strategy Regarding the Audio-Visual Sector,” http://mediatrademonitor.org/filestore2/ download/146 (4 July 2005)

Chang, Ha-Joon (2004). “Trade and Industrial Policy Issues,” in Rethinking Development Economics, ed. Ha-Joon Chang. London: Anthem Press.

Raboy, Marc (1999). “The World Situation of Public Service Broadcasting,” in Public Service Broadcasting in Asia: Surviving in the New Information Age, ed. Asian Media Information and Communication Centre. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre.

Sen, Amartya (2004). “What’s the Use of Music? The Role of the Music Industry in Africa,” Remarks given during the Workshop On the Development of the Music Industry in Africa, Sponsored by The World Bank and The Policy Sciences Center, Inc., Washington, D.C. June 20-21, 2001.

Trebilcock, Michael and Robert Howse (1999). The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Verhulst, Stefaan (1999). “Coping with the New Communications Environment: Are Regulations Still Relevant?,” in Media Regulations for the New Times, ed. Venkat Iyer. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre.

World Trade Organization (1999). The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zampetti, Americo Beviglia (2003). “WTO Rules in the Audio-Visual Sector,” Hamburg Institute of International Economics Report 229.

Footnotes:

 

1 See preamble of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, especially paragraph 2 as well as paragraph 3.

2 This classification follows the Services Sectoral Classification List (MTN.GNS/W/120) used during the Uruguay Round of negotiations on trade in services. This sector comes closest to mass media services, which has a very broad coverage.

3 The subsidy is more specifically defined under Article I of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

4 No progress has also been made with respect to emergency safeguard measures that are to be applied when increased imports due to liberalization results in serious injury to a domestic industry.

5 According to Raboy (1999), [c]ommunity broadcasting generally has little access to conventional funding sources, being of limited interest to advertisers where regulation does not exclude it from the advertising market, and coming far behind conventional public service broadcasting as a priority for public funding (Raboy, 1999: 16).”