Last month saw yet another set of disturbing scenes on the streets of Bangkok. After the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) successfully paralysed Thailand's major international airport with supporters who wore the colour of the royalty and installed a new leadership, the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship or the Red Shirts took their turn. The protests resulted in the death of two protesters, razed buses and other damages. The current government also ordered the closure of community radio stations associated with the Red Shirts.

Chanida Bamford, coordinator of the Banhkok office of Focus on the Global South shares her reflection on these events.

How would you assess the six-week protests of the UDD and their impact on the immediate future of Thai politics?
The prospects for the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) and sympathetic organisations (the red shirts) are very poor: Their figurehead, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, is a fugitive from justice in self-imposed exile; their first-line leadership is in jail; their media outlets— a TV station, numerous community radio stations and over 60 websites)— have been closed and banned. They attempted to copy many of tactics of their arch-enemy, the yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). But where the PAD appear to have enjoyed impunity, the UDD have been suppressed. Their only option now is clandestine circulation of information, much of which is unsubstantiated rumour, and seething resentment.

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has offered the possibility of an amnesty and dialogue on political reform. This would appear to be a progressive development. But two questions have to be asked. Are the offers sincere? And if yes, can he actually deliver?

The offer of dialogue on political reform was made before the latest violence and was presented in a 27-month-long framework for amending a constitution that only took six months to write. This raises suspicions that it was a ploy to buy time without having to call for an election that the ruling Democrat party itself fears it will lose. The amnesty, depending on its terms, may end up exonerating the PAD as well as the UDD and the politicians who were bribed into joining the Democrat-led coalition government as well as red-shirt MPs.

Abhisit became PM on the strength of losing two elections and boycotting a third. The military and palace are widely thought to have been instrumental in engineering his chance of taking office. It is not clear how much freedom the PM would have in acting against the wishes of these parties. Military involvement in human rights abuses, for example, even in cases that happened before PM Abhisit’s watch, have gone unpunished.

How would you assess the roles of the King and the military in quelling and addressing the resentment of Thaksin supporters?
Thailand has some of the fiercest lèse majesté laws in the world and the role of the King cannot even be discussed. All that can be said with any certainty is that the King has said nothing throughout this crisis and the Queen displayed clear partiality towards the PAD. Certainly the PAD are staunchly royalist; and if there are any republicans in Thailand, they will be among the reds.

The elephant in the room that few dare discuss openly is the implications of the current political polarisation on the succession. Right now, the yellow side can point to a benevolent monarch revered by the Thai on the street. But this loyalty is to an increasingly frail 81-year-old monarch, rather than to the monarchy as an institution. The connection between the palace and military is largely mediated by the presence of former military leaders in the Privy Council, most notably Gen. Prem Tinasulanonda, PM through the 1980s, and Gen. Surayudh Chulanond who was appointed PM by the leaders of the 2006 military coup. The reds, through ex-PM Thaksin, raised the stakes by openly accusing these two, together with leaders of the judiciary of being involved in planning the 2006 coup. This is inches away of accusing the palace of involvement in politics.

The military were completely unresponsive when the previous government called on them to deal with the PAD occupations of Government House and the airports. This escalated into virtual insubordination when the Army chief called on national TV for the resignation of the PM. The army were also slow to get involved in the more recent conflict. The police were allowed to show their incompetence, indiscipline and/or reluctance to deal with street blockades in Bangkok for four days before the army moved in. They did so successfully while avoiding the bloodbath of May 1992, which earlier tarnished their reputation.

How polarised is Thai society? How would you describe the possibility for a middle group to emerge?
Thai society has been extremely polarised for a decade. This could ironically be blamed on the 1997 “People’s” Constitution, which aimed to avoid the instability and corruption that happened in repeated coalition governments. It increased the power of the executive while balancing it against a set of new “independent agencies.”

Partly through so-called “populist” policies, Thaksin won handsome electoral majorities, took the enhanced power and preceded to neutralise the “independent agencies.” In the meantime, a system of “policy corruption” enriched his family and businesses. Human rights were trampled with the war on drugs and suppression of violence in the south.

Hatred of Thaksin became the unifying element for the various sectors of society that felt threatened – from business rivals to NGOs to Buddhist fundamentalists. This broad spectrum of interests formed the PAD in 2006 when the military got rid of Thaksin by a bloodless coup.

It was the red's turn to feel threatened. Their PM had been overthrown and the military rammed a new constitution down their throats.They got their own back in the first post coup election, which they won, despite Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party having been dissolved by a compliant court (which found the Democrats not guilty at the same time).

The return of a “proxy” Thaksin government in the December 2007 elections was the cue for the PAD to return to the streets and the ultimate downfall of two pro-Thaksin PMs. The PAD was more openly royalist, nationalist and anti-democratic, alienating its former more progressive supporters. But even groups that might have been expected to be “neutral,” such as human rights organisations, were quickly identified as being one side or the other.

It is important to note that even though each side represents, at best guess, no more than 20 per cent of the population (counting activists and sympathisers), they resemble each other in a way that the disinterested middle does not.

They both rely on charismatic leaders who make outlandish promises. They are both united primarily by hatred for the other side, rather than any positive agenda (hence the vitriolic language commonly used). Both claim to be speaking for the true interest of the country. Both assembled large propaganda operations, mostly aimed at maintaining their own side’s loyalty and demonising the opposition. Both operate by decision-making systems that are in no way democratic.

The few feeble attempts to start a “white shirt” movement have floundered in this supremely negative polarity. It is hard to see any possibilities for progress here.

What has been the impact of the protests for ordinary Thais? Who among them have been grossly effected and why? Lost of ordinary Thais wear red or yellow shirts and are directly affected by the fortunes of their side. Right now the yellows are crowing and feel that they have might as well as right on their side. The reds seethe with resentment at being cheated by a conspiracy of the elite—the palace, the military, the judiciary and the establishment.

“No-colour” Thais wish, to varying degrees, a plague on both their houses. They have suffered disruptions to their lives from blockades of the airports and roads. Workers in some sectors, such as tourism, were already taking a hit that has been made much worse. But probably the biggest effect is indirect. When governments have to concentrate on suppressing opposition forces on the street, they have less time to think what to do about the accelerating collapse of the Thai economy. Already perilously exposed to the global crisis by its heavy reliance in export-led growth, Thailand is less likely to work out constructive policies for saving jobs and businesses if its leaders have to keep running away from mobs.